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Abstract
The present paper sheds new light on the incidence of firm taxation by exploit-
ing the design of a large-scale corporate income tax credit in France. The tax credit
is proportional to the wage bill of workers paid below a hourly wage threshold,
which induces a discontinuity in mandatory levies at the employee level. We use
discontinuities at the employee level in order to estimate firm-level incidence. This
turns out to be the relevant level for the effects of the policy, which would be un-
detectable with an estimation focused on the employee level impact of the shock.
Relying on exhaustive matched employer-employee data, we find a discrepancy
between the absence of incidence at the employee level and a substantial incidence
on wages at the firm level, around 50 %. We find moreover that the policy in ques-
tion has stark (anti)-redistributive effects. The tax cut is targeting the lowest part
of wage earners, but the benefits accrue to other employees inside the firm, who
earn substantially higher wages on average.
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1 Introduction
In the US, the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act reduced the statutory rate of the corporate
income tax (CIT) from 35 % to 21 %, continuing the decline in the effective tax rate
that occurred over the past 25 years (Dyreng et al., 2017). Similar downward trends
of CIT are under way in the EU (DG Taxation and Custom Union, 2017). In a context
of growing international competition, most advanced economies attempt to reduce
mandatory levies on firms in order to support activity and competitiveness, either by
decreasing CIT effective rates or by implementing payroll tax cuts targeting subsets
of the workforce. These changes can have wide implications for domestic and for-
eign investment, for employment, as well as for the income distribution (Harris et al.,
2009). Assessing the distributional consequences necessitates not only estimating the
magnitude of wage incidence in order to determine the share of the benefits from
lower firm taxation captured by wage earners – as opposed to capital owners –, but
also measuring how these wage gains are distributed among workers – high- versus
low-skill/wage (Auerbach, 2018).1
This paper sheds new light on the wage incidence of firm taxation by taking ad-
vantage of a French reform which provides a quasi-natural experiment inducing varia-
tion in the burden of firm taxation. The Competitiveness and Employment Tax Credit
(CICE hereafter)2, introduced in 2013, is attributed for employees with wages up to
2.5 times the minimum wages (MW). The schedule therefore introduces a sharp dis-
continuity in mandatory levies at the 2.5 minimum wage (MW) eligibility threshold.
It generates treatment intensity differences between otherwise similar employees and
firms. Leveraging this discontinuity and using a rich matched employer-employee
database, we are able to estimate and contrast the incidence of the tax credit from an
employee- and a firm-level perspective. We develop a firm-level methodology based
on employee-level discontinuity allowing us to estimate a collective incidence that
cannot be detected by employee-level methodologies. Our results point to a discrep-
ancy between the absence of incidence at the employee level and a substantial inci-
dence on wages at the firm level. Moreover, the actual distributive impact of the tax
credit is disconnected from the targeting of the policy as wage increases mostly benefit
high-skill workers.
Our empirical analysis is first carried out at the employee level. It aims at detecting
a possible deformation of the wage structure around the 2.5 MW eligibility threshold,
1Auerbach (2018) concludes his analysis of the recent US CIT reform by writing: “ [...] One should not
think about wage and salary earners as a monolithic group. Whether through differences in rent sharing across the
income distribution, or differences in capital-labor complementarity that lead to differences in gains, the effects of
corporate taxation on different groups of wage earners is another direction in which distributional analysis needs
to develop.”.
2CICE is the acronym in French: Cre´dit d’impoˆt pour la compe´titivite´ et l’emploi.
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based on the methodologies developed by McCrary (2008) and Chetty et al. (2011).
However, we do not find any bunching in the distribution of new hires’ wages nor any
deformation of wage growth distribution with respect to the initial wage. These results
are consistent with a growing literature concluding the absence of payroll tax net wage
incidence at the employee-level (Bosch and Micevska-Scharf, 2017; Bozio et al., 2017a).3
They can have two alternative explanations: (i.) economic and statutory incidence
coincide and employers bear the full burden of corporate taxes (Alvaredo et al., 2017);
(ii.) incidence on wages is not aligned with the policy targeting and benefits to a wider
range of employees (Saez et al., 2018).
To determine which mechanism dominates, we develop a firm-level analysis. We
isolate the variation in firm-level treatment intensity that stems from the discontinu-
ity of the schedule at the employee level. We construct cells of firms with similar
pre-reform characteristics thanks to a grid based on the wage bill cumulative density
function slightly below and above the 2.5 MW threshold (actually at 2.2 MW and 2.8
MW) interacted with sector and size categories. We confirm the validity of the within
cell difference in difference estimations: within cells (i.) the common trend assumption
holds; (ii.) the variation of treatment intensity remains large.
Our results point to a substantial wage incidence of CICE at the firm level: a e1
increase in CICE translates into a e0.5 increase in overall wage bill. The magnitude
of the wage incidence of the tax credit meets a recent body of work estimating that
labor bears between 30 % and 50 % of the CIT burden, relying on different sources of
variation: CIT rates differences across industries (Liu and Altshuler, 2013), CIT rates
changes at the country level in Europe (Arulampalam et al., 2012) or in the OECD
(Aze´mar and Hubbard, 2015), at the state level in the US (Sua´rez Serrato and Zidar,
2016) and at the municipal level in Germany (Fuest et al., 2018).
Our analysis highlights that the absence of wage adjustment at the employee level
hides a substantial incidence at the firm level. This pattern is also found in a recent
study by Saez et al. (2018) of a program of payroll tax cut (rather than CIT cut) target-
ing young workers in Sweden (rather than workers below a given wage in France).
They conclude that the absence of wage incidence at the employee level along the age
eligibility threshold, but find evidence of firm-level rent-sharing as firms benefiting
more intensely from the reform increase wages for both eligible (young) and ineligible
(old) workers.
The existence of incidence at the firm-level but not at the employee-level does not
mean however that wage incidence is homogenous. We demonstrate that only upper
3In a recent article, Bozio et al. (2017b) find that the wage incidence of social security contributions
in France depends on tax-benefit linkages: there is no effect on net earnings of an increase in health
and family contributions – with no contributory link between contributions and benefits – while the
incidence of pension contributions – with a clear contributory link – largely falls on workers. The tax
credit we analyze in this paper has no contributory link.
3
socioprofessional categories benefit from wage increases, although they are less likely
to contribute to the firms’ CICE eligibility. The heterogenity in wage incidence be-
tween skill groups is also documented by Fuest et al. (2018).4 Overall, heterogeneity in
wage incidence across socioprofessional categories suggests that reforms of firm taxa-
tion may have substantial effects on the income distribution, which is consistent with
an emerging literature highlighting the role of firms in shaping labor market inequali-
ties (Card et al., 2016).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the CICE scheme is explained in
Section 2 and the databases are detailed in Section 3. In Section 4, we present evidence
on employee-level incidence. The identification strategy at firm-level is documented in
Section 5, in addition to central results, robustness checks and tests for heterogenous
impacts. Section 6 concludes and puts into perspective the impacts of the CICE we
highlight in this paper.
2 The Competitiveness and Employment Tax Credit
This section describes the policy we are leveraging to uncover the mechanisms driving
the wage incidence of a corporate income tax credit. Labeled CICE, the implementa-
tion of the Competitiveness and Employment Tax Credit was decided in late 2012 by
a newly elected government facing a challenging economic context (high unemploy-
ment, low corporate profitability5). Introduced January 1st 2013, its amount is equal
to a proportion of the wage bill accruing to workers paid below 2.5 MW: employees
paid above 2.5 times the minimum hourly wage trigger no corporate income tax credit
while others allow the firm to benefit from a corporate income tax credit equal to 4% of
their wage bill in 2013 and 6% of their wage bill in 2014 and 2015.6. In addition to the
large amount it represents (0.56 point of GDP in 2013 and respectively 0.83 and 0.82
point of GDP in 2014 and 2015) the CICE has two main characteristics useful for iden-
tification of its effect on wages: the design of the schedule introduces a discontinuity
at 2.5 minimum wage (MW) and could hardly be anticipated.
→ The CICE could not be anticipated firms The idea behind the CICE originates
from a report by Louis Gallois (2012) – French businessman and former CEO –,
on the behalf of the government. He emphasized the loss of French market shares
worldwide and the need to restore firm competitiveness. He therefore advocated
4Studying opposite CIT changes – tax hikes instead of tax cuts –, they show that low-skill workers
were the most penalized by wage decreases due to CIT increases in Germany.
5The profit rate – ratio of gross operating surplus to value added – was at 30.25 % in 2012, a figure
lower than in previous years (31.70% over the years 2008-2011 and 32.63% for the years 2000-2010.
Source: INSEE, Comptes nationaux).
6The CICE is still ongoing, but our analysis ends in 2015 as additional payroll tax cuts were imple-
mented in 2016, with the potential of interfering with our estimations.
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for a payroll tax cut up to 3.5 MW in the manufacturing sector (in the form of CIT
and of a cut in social security contributions). This cutoff was meant to ensure that
exporting firms, which tend to pay higher wages, would largely benefit from the
measure. However, the estimated cost of such a measure was very high and
the 3.5 MW was deemed too high by labor economists on the ground that the
elasticity of labor demand to labor cost is higher for the lower part of the wage
distribution.7 Due to this debate, the actual CICE differs substantially from the
recommended policy: it consists in a CIT credit instead of social contribution cuts
and was set up to 2.5 MW instead of 3.5 MW. Furthermore, little time elapsed
between the release of the report – November 5th 2012 – and the implementation
of the CICE beginning January 1st 2013 (from Finance Act of December 29th 2012),
making any possibility of anticipation quite unlikely.
→ The CICE is discontinuous. If a firm has one employee paid 2.5 MW, it gets
the maximum per capita amount of tax credit (4% of her wage in 2013, 6% in
2014 and 2015), while if the one employee is paid 2.51 MW, the firm will get
no tax credit. This discontinuity is a new feature in the French policies using
mandatory levy cuts to decrease labor costs. Figure 1 presents a comparison of
the CICE (in red) with pre-existing and still on-going payroll tax cuts. Prior to
2013, large payroll tax cuts targeted low wages, they consist in about 26% of the
gross wage at the minimum wage and continuously decrease to reach 0 at 1.6
MW. In contrast, the CICE, which does not replace but supplements these pre-
existing cuts, is flat up to 2.5 MW and falls down to 0 above this threshold. The
CICE generates large differences between very similar employees as in 2015, 6%
of 2.5 MW corresponded to 2,624 euros per employee.
Figure 1: The CICE schedule in comparison with pre-existing cuts on payroll tax
CICE as share of gross wage CICE amount for a full time job
7See Fabre (2012) for a journalistic account of the debate just before the adoption.
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Beyond these features, particularly valuable for estimation purposes, the level of
the threshold also implies that a very high share of workers are eligible. Figure 2
presents the share of wage bill eligible to the CICE by socio-professional category.
Regarding blue collar workers and other employees8 (on the top row, respectively on
the left- and right-hand side), nearly all the salaried workers are eligible. Moreover, a
substantial share of executives, intellectual and intermediate occupations9 (bottom left
and right respectively) is also eligible to the CICE. The threshold therefore generates
an employee-level discontinuity at a wage level where density of high skill workers is
large.
Figure 2: Distribution of wages by occupation
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8We consider here the socioprofessional categories of the French statistics classification as it is the
actual classification in the databases: blue collar workers correspond mainly to plant and machine op-
erators and assemblers (8) in the ISCO-08 classification of the International labor organisation (ILO);
other employees correspond to clerical support workers (4), services and sales workers (5) and ele-
mentary occupations (9). We group these categories and named them low-skill occupations as they
correspond to the skill levels 1 and 2 of the ILO classification.
9Executives and intellectual occupations correspond to managers (1) and professionals (2) in the
ISCO-08 classification; intermediate occupations correspond to technicians and associate professionals
(3). We group these categories and named them high-skill occupations as they correspond to the skill
levels 3 and 4 of the ILO classification.
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Finally, although there is little variation in treatment status (extensive margin)
given that most firms are eligible to the CICE, firms are differently exposed in treat-
ment intensity (intensive margin) depending on their wage structure. Notably, as the
threshold is central in the wage distribution of high skill workers, even firms with a
similar socioprofessional composition of their workforce may be differently treated in
the intensive margin. This is reflected in Figure 3 which depicts variation in treatment
intensity according to firm size. The top left histogram is based on the full sample of
firms. Many firms have all their employees eligible, they get the maximum of CICE
relative to their wage bill (4% in 2013 and 6% in 2014 and 2015). The other graphs
present the same distribution by firm size category. Interestingly, there is not only
variation between firms of different size but also between firms belonging to similar
size categories. This is especially true for medium-sized firms (bottom left) and for
larger firms (bottom right). Our identification strategy – presented in section 5 – aims
at isolating the exogenous part of this treatment intensity differences.
Figure 3: Distribution of firm-level treatment intensity size in 2013 and 2014
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7
3 Data
The empirical analysis relies on the exploitation of employer-employee data over the
period 2009-2015. The main features of these databases are presented here while addi-
tional details may be found in appendix A.1.
3.1 Data at the individual level
The annual social data declaration files (DADS) contain, for each salaried contract,
information on gross wages, working time, socioprofessional categories, type of con-
tract, gender, etc. The exhaustive DADS cannot be turned into a worker-level panel
as the employee identifier is not recognizable from one vintage to the other. For each
vintage however, the value of the variables are given for the current and the previ-
ous year. This enables us to compute the yearly growth rate of wages. Moreover the
administrative identifiers of French firms (code SIREN) are available over time which
allows to constitute a panel of employer employee data.
Information on wages, our main outcome variable, is central in our analysis. Gross
compensation includes “all remuneration received by the employee under her con-
tract of employment, before deducting compulsory contributions.” These pay data
present the advantage to be accurate and exhaustive. However they do not allow to
decompose the overall compensation into different components. For instance, it in-
cludes bonuses for end of fixed-term contracts (corresponding to 10% of the amount
received during the contract) which could lead to biases in the measurement of hourly
wage growth since these bonuses inflate the total gross earnings but not the number
of hours worked the year of the contract term. To overcome this potential issue, we
focus in the empirical analysis on the mean wage of permanent contracts. Moreover,
as it will be made clear below, we are able to predict very precisely the tax credit firms
can officially claim on the basis of their pre-reform wage structure, meaning that these
data are very reliable for the purpose of our study.
3.2 Data at the firm-level
General information on the production structure of firms, income statement and balance-
sheet are presented in the FARE database of the ESANE system (annual business statis-
tics). It is built by Insee10 on the basis of the tax data, social declarations and a survey.
This database covers all firms (including firms without employees) with the exception
of the financial sector and agriculture sector. We use it to control for firm characteris-
10National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies
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tics, in terms of productivity (value added divided by average workforce) and capital
stock (tangible and intangible assets). 11
We also obtained access to the MVC tax files which document firms’ CICE rights.
This database, whose first vintage is 2013, gathers information for all firms benefit-
ing from the CICE. For each firm we know the initialization, i.e. the amount of tax
credit to which the firm is entitled for a given year. In contains around 800,000 obser-
vations per year but in the analysis we will exclude unincorporated firms for which
information from other sources is lacking. A large number of firms benefits from a
relatively small amount of CICE, with an average of e2,756 for micro-enterprises and
e24,492 for SMEs, whereas the amounts received by large firms are ten to one hundred
times larger: the 288 largest firms present in the database have in 2013 a tax credit ap-
proximately equal to that of the 496,750 micro-enterprises. However, in the empirical
analysis, treatment intensity will be computed, not in absolute terms, but in relative
terms as a share of firm wagebill, in order to measure how much labor cost is reduced
for firms.
In order to carry out our difference in difference strategy and to avoid endogeneity
issues, it is necessary to be able to measure the CICE to which a firm or an employee
would have been entitled to, before the reform implementation, based on its wage
structure. Such information was not directly collected by tax authorities prior to 2013.
However, the DADS database allows us to approximate these values thanks to the
accuracy on wage structure of firms. It is indeed possible to calculate the share of
wage bill below 2.5 MW, and to compute a potential CICE.12 This calculation for the
years 2013 to 2015 of predicted CICE (given past wage structure) is very close to the
amounts of CICE actually initialized with the tax agency and presented in the MVC
database (see table 3 below).
3.3 Building the final database
The three previously presented databases are merged to build the final dataset. We
first match the employee level data DADS with the MVC file on tax credit, which im-
plies that we keep in the analysis only the firms benefiting from the CICE. We calculate
the ratio of the CICE imputed on the basis of the DADS database over the actual CICE
initiated in the MVC database. We exclude from the sample the firms whose ratio be-
longs to the upper percentile in 2013, in 2014 or in 2015. We then match it with the
11Note that information on profits is also available but is not sufficiently reliable to be used as a
dependent variable because firms can account differently for the CICE (as a deduction of labor costs,
as operating subsidies, other operating income or CIT deduction). Thus, the various measures of profit
(EBIT, EBITDA, operating income) may or may not take into account the CICE depending on the firm.
12Similar wage structure indicators can also be built at other thresholds (1.5 MW in particular) in
order to better approximate the distribution of wage in the firms.
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FARE database. Only the firms present in the three datasets (DADS-FARE-MVC) are
kept in the analysis We then make two selections. First, we keep only firms that have
at least one full-time equivalent job over the years and exclude firms in the extreme
percentiles of profit margin, capital intensity and wage growth. Second, we construct a
balanced panel over the period 2009-2015 to avoid composition effects which could po-
tentially bias estimations. The resulting dataset contains 325,329 firms, that amounts
for 64.6% of total CICE in 2013 (64.3% in 2014 and 63.8% in 2015).
4 Absence of incidence at the employee-level
The sharp discontinuity (notch) at 2.5 MW could likely influence firms’ wage setting
behavior: the CICE rate is constant (4% in 2013 and 6% starting in 2014) and sud-
denly dies down at 2.5 MW. Thus, a full-time employee paid two and a half times the
minimum wage opened in 2014 an annual tax credit of e2,624 for his employer. If
she had been paid even a few euros more, her employer could not have received any
tax credit. With perfect control over the assignment variable - namely the position of
the employee’s hourly wage with respect to the threshold - such a large notch should
lead to discontinuity of the employees density function, with sharp bunching prior
the threshold (Kleven and Waseem, 2013). With imperfect control over the assignment
variable, it may lead to smoothed bunching before the threshold or to deformation of
the distribution of outcomes (Carbonnier et al., 2014): in the present case a slowing
down of wage increases around the threshold. We test for such behaviors graphically
and econometrically: we first analyze the wage distribution of employees, focusing on
new hires for which the control over the assignment variable is maximum; we then
turn to the distribution of wage growth for incumbent employees.
4.1 Distribution of new hires wages
As discussed above, the policy creates a direct incentive for the firm to set their em-
ployees’ wages below the threshold. This incentive is however contradicted by the
strong downward rigidity of nominal wages, giving firms little power to decrease
wages. For this reason, we first focus on new hires, whose wage suffers no path de-
pendency, and should reveal more evidently firms’ behaviors, if any. In this analysis,
new hires include permanent and fixed term contracts.
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Testing for a discontinuity at the notch
A simple plot of the distribution of new hires’ wage in a large window around the
cutoff for years ranging between 2009 and 2015 suggests no major deformation of the
distribution as the curves profiles are very similar (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Distribution of wage of new hires, 2009-2015
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Note: The y-axis refers to number of hires in thousands. Hires are defined as jobs starting in February
or later at year t that did not exist in year t − 1 taken up by workers not employed in the same firm at
t−1. Firms with no employment at year t−1 are excluded. We restrict the sample to hires by employers
included in the firm-level estimation sample. Source: DADS 2009-2015.
We then turn to an econometric analysis. Following McCrary (2008), we implement
linear regressions of the number of hiring in bins of the distribution of hiring wages
(defined such that no bin contains wages both below and above the cutoff), with sep-
arate regressors on each side of the threshold. The parameter of interest is the log
difference θ of the estimated number of hires at the notch. A positive θ indicates an ex-
cess mass to the right of the cutoff, a negative θ an excess mass to the left of the cutoff.
It could be that 2.5 MW is special point in the distribution, generating “natural” dis-
continuity: to alleviate concerns about such possibly of pre-existing bunching at the
notch confounding our analysis, we plot the estimated θ as well as their confidence
intervals for each year of the 2009-2015 time frame (Figure 5).
Coefficients are very close to zero before and after the introduction of the CICE
in 2013 and, overall, not statistically different from zero. The only exception is 2010:
θ nearly becomes significant, with a small standard error. However, the magnitude
of the coefficient remains very low and this coefficient is very close to those of other
11
Figure 5: Discontinuity estimates θ, 2009-2015
Note: The y-axis refers to the log difference in height at the cutoff in the wage distributions of new
hires. Hires are defined as jobs starting in February or later at year t that did not exist in year t−1 taken
up by workers not employed in the same firm at t − 1. Firms with no employment at year t − 1 are
excluded. We restrict the sample to hires by employers included in the firm-level estimation sample.
Source: DADS 2009-2015.
years. Hence, we can conclude at the absence of discontinuity of hires at the CICE
threshold.
Estimating bunching to the left of the notch
The absence of discontinuity does not rule out the possibility of smoothed bunching
before the threshold because of imperfect control over the assignment variable. To
detect bunching of new hires to the left of 2.5 MW, we use a method developed in the
case of kinks by Chetty et al. (2011) based on Saez (2010). The goal is to detect a local
excess mass relative to the density near the threshold, while taking into account the
fact that this local excess mass has to be compensated for elsewhere.
We first choose a window in which we believe bunching may occur. Our preferred
window ranges between 2.3 and 2.5 MW, but alternatives are tested, with windows
ranging from 2.0-2.5 to 2.4-2.5 MW, with 0.1 MW increments (see online complemen-
tary materials, results of all specifications are consistent). We then interpolate the den-
sity function of new hires outside the window. To do so, hires are grouped in bins
of 0.75 MW width and wages are rescaled such that the discontinuity occurs in bin
i = 0. The number of hires Ci in each bin i is regressed on a polynome of wages (Zi)
and on bin dummies for bins inside the bunching window [−R, 0] (with R = 0.2 in
central specification and R = 0.1 − 0.5 for robustness test in table A2). Polynomial
coefficients – excluding bin dummies – are used to compute a counterfactual distribu-
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tion of hires Cˆi. Importantly, the counterfactual distribution accounts for the fact that
the excess mass expected to the left of the notch has to be compensated for to the right
of the notch. This adjustment is computed by successive iterations of the regression
until a fixed point is reached. Finally, we compute the difference between actual and
counterfactual hires within the bunching window (Equation 1).
BˆN =
0∑
i=−R
Ci − Cˆi (1)
The actual bunching estimator bˆ is then given by equation 2, with standard error esti-
mated by bootstrap method.
bˆ =
BˆN
1
R+1
∑0
i=−R Cˆi
(2)
It represents the excess number of hires in the bunching zone expressed relative to the
counterfactual density at the threshold. A significantly positive bˆ would indicate an
accumulation of hires in the bunching zone, a significantly negative bˆ would imply a
lack of hires in the bunching zone. Results are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Detection of bunching of new hires before the threshold of CICE, [2.3, 2.5]
Before the CICE After the CICE
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
bˆ 0.39 -0.16 -0.03 0.48 0.10 0.01 0.02
(0.30) (0.26) (0.68) (0.30) (0.27) (0.32) (0.28)
Note: New hires are defined as workers whose contract starts during the year and that were not pre-
viously employed in the same firm. Sample restrictions: The sample is restricted to employees whose
contract starts during the year and that were not previously employed in the same firm. We further re-
strict the analysis to employers included in the firm-level estimation sample. Sources: DADS 2009-2015.
*: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001.
The sample estimates are all close to zero and insignificant, both in the pre- and
post-reform years, which confirms the previous results of absence of response in terms
of hiring. Our analysis of the wage distribution of new hires demonstrates that firms
did not change their wage-setting behaviors to take advantage of the discontinuity 2.5
MW created by the introduction of the CICE.
4.2 No deformation in the wage growth of employees
We now turn to incumbent employees, whose wages were already set prior to the
reform, and analyze the distribution of wage growth according to initial wage. To do
so, we keep only employees with permanent contract working full time in the same
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firm two consecutive years, and calculate the hourly wage growth in year n relative to
year n − 1. Figure 6 presents the evolution of wage growth for these “ stayers” each
year from 2009 to 2015. A brief visual inspection reveals no sharp deformation of the
distribution in post-reform years: the curves’ profiles for years before and after the
reform are very similar, with no deformation of the wage growth distribution around
the 2.5 MW threshold. The curves change from one year to another, but the overall
pattern is stable over time: wage increases are larger for employees paid less than
1.5 MW, are stable at around 2% up to 2.5 MW, and then gradually decrease for higher
wages. Since both pre- and post-reform curves exhibit this same pattern, this graphical
analysis that the decline in wage growth after 2.5MW is not due to the CICE.
Figure 6: Distribution of wage growth of stayers, 2009-2015
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Note: Stayers are defined as workers in permanent contract working full-time (32 hrs per week or more)
who kept the same occupation within the same firm between t and t− 1. Sample restriction: The sample
is restricted employees in permanent contracts from year t to t− 1 who stay within the same employer.
We further restrict the analysis to employers included in the firm-level estimation sample. Bins are
defined as intervals of equal length. The length is set so that there are 150 bins over the [150%, 350%]
interval. Source: DADS 2009-2015.
We formally test for a potential deformation of the distribution around the 2.5 MW
threshold for years after the reform. In the same spirit as for new hires, we seek to
detect a deformation in the relationship between wage growth and initial wage of
stayers.13 We test for a deformation of the distribution within a window around the
threshold. In the present setting, the window stretches both to the left and to the right
13Here, however, we do not need to impose that the distribution deformation below the threshold is
compensated for above it since we are analyzing a conditional expected value, not a distribution.
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of the cutoff as employers may reduce the growth rate of employees paid just above the
threshold, waiting for potential minimum wage increase to make their wage eligible.
We model employee wage growth gi as a nth order polynomial of initial wage w0,i.
We estimate the model excluding the window [2.3,2.7]. We obtain a vector βˆn of di-
mension n + 1. Based on this vector, we predict the average wage growth within
the window using the estimated parameter and the average values of the predictors
X¯ = [1, w10, w
2
0, ..., w
n
0 ], where w
p
0 refers to the sample mean of the initial wage to the
power p within the window around the threshold.14 We then compare the average
predicted wage growth based on the model estimated excluding observations in the
window gˆ = X¯ ′βˆn and the observed wage growth g¯. We test the significance of the
gap Gˆ = g¯− gˆ between actual and counterfactual growth wage, under the assumption
that the two estimators are independent. Results of central specification are presented
in Table 2. Within the excluded window, there seems to be no distance between the
actual distribution and the interpolation although these bins were not used to fit the
polynomial.
Table 2: Detection of deformation of the relationship between wage growth and initial
wage – [2.3, 2.7] window
Year g¯ gˆ Gˆ = g¯ − gˆ z-stat
2010 0.02708 0.02711 -0.00003 -0.10
2011 0.03786 0.03806 -0.00020 -0.95
2012 0.02733 0.02702 0.00031 1.13
2013 0.01387 0.01222 0.00164*** 13.59
2014 0.02186 0.02161 0.00025 0.97
2015 0.02297 0.02267 0.00030 1.79
Note: gˆ refers to the predicted mean wage growth based on a 10-degree polynomial in initial wage in
the window around the threshold. The model is estimated excluding observations in the window. g¯
is the observed sample mean of wage growth in the same window. Sample restriction: The sample is
restricted employees in permanent contracts from year t to t − 1 who stay within the same employer.
We further restrict the analysis to employers included in the firm-level estimation sample. Sources :
MVC, FARE, DADS Postes. *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001
The econometric test shows that wages around the threshold do not increase less
rapidly as the gaps between actual and predicted mean wage growth are close to zero,
or even positive in 2013. Indeed, the 2013 estimate is significantly positive, implying
that wages in the window actually increased more rapidly than predicted by the poly-
nomial interpolation. This is not what should be expected assuming firm maximize
their exposure to the reform. However in 2013, the CICE was equal to 4% of gross
wage up to 2.5 MW. Therefore the significant coefficient for 2013 corresponds only to
0.16% additional wage growth in the window. Even significant, the coefficient may
14That is: wp0 ≡ (
∑
i 1(i ∈ window))−1
∑
i 1(i ∈ window)× wp0,i.
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be interpreted as a significant zero. To confirm this interpretation, we therefore com-
plement the statistical investigation with a graphical analysis by focusing on the year
2013 in figure 7.15 We start by grouping employees in fine bins according to their wage
in the previous year and compute the mean wage growth for each bin. We plot these
wage growth means against hourly wage in year n−1. We then estimate a polynomial
interpolation of this relationship (green line) excluding observations just around the
2.5 MW threshold (red dots).
Figure 7: Distribution of wage growth of stayers, in 2013
Note: Stayers are defined as workers in permanent contract working full-time (32 hrs per week or more)
who kept the same occupation within the same firm between t and t− 1. Sample restriction: The sample
is restricted employees in permanent contracts from year t to t− 1 who stay within the same employer.
We further restrict the analysis to employers included in the firm-level estimation sample. Bins are
defined as intervals of equal length. The length is set so that there are 150 bins over the [150%, 350%]
interval. Source: DADS 2013.
We therefore conclude from this analysis that firms did not condition their wage
increase behaviors to the eligibility of workers to the CICE. The reform had no effect on
the wage distribution of new hires, although their wages could possibly be easily set
below the cutoff. It also resulted in no deformation of the wage growth distribution,
although we could expect firm to limit the wage increase for employees close to the
threshold.
15This figure is also presented for other years in the appendix, see panels of figure A1
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4.3 Implications and rationalization
The wage incidence analysis at employee-level compellingly documents that firms did
not change their wage setting behaviors in response to the eligibility status of employ-
ees. Bozio et al. (2017b) points that incidence differs depending on the existence of
tax-benefit linkage, with incidence at employee level only for contributory levies. For
non-contributory levies - the case of the CICE - several papers conclude to the absence
of incidence at the employee level (Alvaredo et al., 2017; Bozio et al., 2017a; Bosch and
Micevska-Scharf, 2017).
Such absence of bunching at the notch is not trivial as it implies a sharp labor cost
differential among otherwise similar workers. This result is at odds with standard
models of the labor market where workers’ marginal cost is equated to their marginal
productivity. A first rationalization may lie in labor market institutions: collective
wage agreements at the industry level - which cover an overwhelming majority of
workers in France (OECD, 2012) - could prevent firms from adjusting wages. How-
ever, this agreements are not fully binding and firms still have flexibility in wage set-
ting, as highlighted by the limited importance of downward wage rigidity after the
2008 recession in France (Verdugo, 2016).
An alternative rationalization is that the absence of incidence at the employee level
hides wage incidence at the firm-level independently from the individual employee
eligibility. Saez et al. (2018) study an age targeted non-contributory payroll tax cut
in Sweden and find no incidence at the employee level (around the age threshold)
but a substantial incidence at the firm level (wage increase independently from the
age threshold). They propose within firm fairness norms as potential explanation (as
previously proposed by Saez et al. (2012)). In the presence of relative wage concerns
among coworkers, granting lower wage growth to employees just below the threshold
so that they remain eligible might be perceived as arbitrary and unfair. Such firm
policy could reduce motivation and eventually result in drop out (Dube et al., 2015).
As an employee-level analysis would fail to detect such a collective incidence, we now
turn to a firm-level analysis.
5 Substantial Firm-level Incidence
We have documented that employee eligibility has not affected wage rates for new
hires or wage growth for job stayers. The aim of this section is to analyze whether the
CICE has led to wage adjustment at the firm level following the introduction of the
CICE 2013.
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5.1 Identification strategy
The aim of our firm-level analysis is to compare firms that are similar except in their ex-
position to the CICE, before and after its implementation in 2013. This section presents
in details our identification strategy.
Exploiting firm-level treatment intensity
Our econometric analysis relies on the exploitation of firm-level variation in treatment
intensity rather than in treatment status as most firms have at least on person eligible
to the CICE and therefore benefit from it. Treatment intensity is defined as the ratio of
tax credit claimed to the firm wage bill : it corresponds to an effective tax credit rate.
Using data on the amount of tax credit claimed each year from 2013 to 2015, we can
construct the treatment intensity as follows:
Dit =
(∑
j∈i
wjthjt
)−1
Tax Credit Claimedit
where wjt and hjt denote hourly wage and hours worked for worker j employed in
firm i during in year t.
Addressing endogeneity concerns
We then need to tackle a potential endogeneity bias in treatment intensity which can
arise from reverse causality issues. Indeed, treatment intensity is obviously a function
of wages and employment, which are potential determinants of the CICE. For instance,
if as expected by policy makers, the policy contributes to boost employment, it can
automatically increase the amount of tax credit a firm can claim – as long as the hired
person is paid below 2.5 MW. Alternatively, if a firm suffers from a negative shock, it
might lower its wages, and the amount of tax credit with respect to overall wage bill
should increase accordingly.
A common solution used in the literature to tackle this reverse causality is to build
the treatment intensity using lagged values of the tax (or subsidy) base. This strategy
was first used by Auten and Carroll (1999) in their estimation of the elasticity of taxable
income, by applying the variation in the rate to the earned income the year preceding
the reform. The same type of methodology, that involves applying contemporaneous
changes in policy variables to pre-reform firm-level outcomes, was also used to evalu-
ate the impact of social contribution rebates in France (Cre´pon and Desplatz, 2001) or
more recently in Sweden (Saez et al., 2018).
In the present case, we use the share of eligible wage bill (i.e. the amount of wages
accruing to employees paid less than 2.5 MW divided by the total wage bill) in 2012,
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the year preceding the introduction of the CICE, to instrument the treatment intensity.
The relative stability of the wage structure ensures a strong correlation between the ex
ante measure of exposure and the ex post one. The predicted treatment intensity, based
on the 2012 wage bill, is computed as follows:
Zi =
(∑
j∈i
wj0hj0
)−1∑
j∈i
wj0hj01(wj0 < 2.5×Min Wage0)× τ (3)
where wj0 and hj0 denote hourly wage and hours worked for worker j employed in
firm i during the last pre-reform year denoted 0. τ is time-invariant and is set to reflect
the average rate of subsidy over the period (the mean of 4% in 2013, 6% in 2014 and
6% in 2015 yields 5.33%).
Our paper focuses on reduced-form estimates. It is nevertheless informative to
check how our predicted treatment intensity relates to the actual treatment intensity.
We thus regress the actual treatment intensity, our endogenous variable, on the pre-
dicted treatment intensity, our instrument. Table 3 presents estimation results and
shows that our instrument is a good predictor of firms’ treatment intensity. The coeffi-
cients are highly significant and not too distant from unity, with R-squares of .359 and
.457 for 2013 and 2014 respectively.
Table 3: Regressions of the actual treatment intensity on the instrument for 2013 and
2014
Actual Treatment Actual Treatment
Intensity (2013) Intensity (2014)
Predicted Treatment Intensity (2012) 0.832*** 0.804***
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 325,329 325,329
R2 0.359 0.457
Note: This table presents results from a linear regression of the endogenous variable (amount of CICE
claimed over gross wage bill) on the instrument (predicted CICE ratio based on 2012 wage structure).
This is a cross-sectional regression with one observation per firm. Sources: DADS, FARE, MVC 2010-
2015. *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001.
Common trend assumption and cell matching
In this subsection, we describe our identification strategy in more details. An obvious
issue with the instrument defined in this Equation (3) in a double difference setting is
that differences in exposure to the CICE might reflect differences in firms’ production
function or in skill-intensity. If variation in treatment intensity were driven by such
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fundamental differences, the common trend assumption upon which the difference-
in-differences relies would not hold. To deal with this obvious issue, our firm-level
regression aims at isolating variation in treatment intensity which is driven only by
discontinuity in eligibility at the 2.5 MW threshold.
In an ideal setting, the natural experiment approach would be to leverage this dis-
continuity by implementing a regression discontinuity design at the firm level, com-
paring the relative wage evolution of firms whose entire workforce is paid just below
2.5 MW in 2012 to those whose entire workforce is paid just above the threshold. How-
ever, in practice all firms exhibit a positive degree of within-firm wage dispersion and
applying a direct RDD is not feasible. We approximate this approach by augmenting
our difference-in-differences specification so as to rely on variation in treatment in-
tensity that stems from local differences in the wage distribution around the 2.5 MW
threshold.
We group firms so that they are similar in terms of industry, size and wage distri-
bution, except around the eligibility threshold. To do so, we set the window within
which we allow the distribution of wages to vary. The bounds of this window are 2.2
MW and 2.8 MW.16 To ensure the distribution outside the window is comparable, we
compute for each firm the share of the wage bill below 2.2 MW and below 2.8 MW
in 2012, the year prior the reform. We discretize these variables ranging from 0% to
100% with a step of 3.33 percentage points.17 The interaction of these two variables
yields a grid. We implement estimations within cells constituted as the interaction of
the grid and the sectoral and size categories. Figure 2 illustrates this method for firms
in a given industry × size group. Within each cell, firms have a similar share of wage
bill accruing to workers paid less than 2.2 MW and less than 2.8 MW.
Figure 8 shows that firms in cell A have between 95% and 100% of their wage bill
accruing to workers paid less than 2.2 MW, they are intensely exposed to the CICE,
while firms in cell B have between 0% and 5% of their wage bill accruing to work-
ers paid less than 2.8 MW. They are (almost) not exposed to the CICE. Although very
differently exposed to the CICE, they are likely too different to be comparable. In-
stead, our methodology will compare firms with a similar wage distribution, except
immediately around the eligibility threshold. To ensure this variation is substantial
within-cell, we define subsets of firms according to the share of their wage bill paid
to workers earning between 2.2 and 2.8 MW. The first subsample includes only firms
whose share is higher higher 30%, the second firms whose share is at least 50%.18 The
existence of differences in the local repartition of wages produces substantial variation
16As a sensitivity check, we also experiment with setting the bounds to 2.3 MW and 2.7 MW.
17As a sensitivity check, we also use a step of 2 and 5 percentage points.
18These subsets are not representative of the full sample. They tend to contain smaller, more produc-
tive and more skill intensive firms. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table A1.
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Figure 8: Illustration of the grid methodology applied to firms belonging to the same
size category and industry
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Lecture: Firms in cell A have between 95% and 100% of their wage bill accruing to workers paid less
than 2.2 MW. Firms in cell B have between 0% and 5% of their wage bill paid to workers earning less
than 2.8 MW. Firms in cell B have between 30% and 35% of their wage bill paid to workers earning less
than 2.8 MW, but between 95% and 100% of their wage bill above 2.2 MW. It implies that more than
50% of their wage bill accrues to workers paid between 2.2 and 2.8 MW. The bottom right hand corner
contains no firms, by construction, as the share of wage bill below 2.2 MW cannot be larger than the
share of wage bill below 2.8 MW.
in treatment intensity between otherwise similar firms. In addition, this variation is
less likely to be correlated with confounding factors.
To illustrate the intuition behind our cell methodology, we plot the evolution of
the mean hourly wage (base 1 inf 2012) of two categories of firms (Figure 9). We com-
pute a within-cell median treatment intensity, and compare firms whose treatment
intensity is above or below the within-cell median. Since, within-cell, firms are simi-
lar, except for their exposure to the CICE, we expect that the two groups have similar
pre-trends. Indeed, wages of the two groups superimpose nearly perfectly for the pre-
reform years. From 2013, wages gradually diverge as they increase relatively more in
firms more intensely treated, i.e. above the within cell median.
Specifications
The baseline specification writes as follows:
ln(Yi,t) = αi + αc,t + β · Zi · 1{t ≥ 2013}+X ′i,t−1γ + εi,t (4)
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Figure 9: Mean wage of firms depending on their position with respect to median
treatment intensity in their matching cell
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Note: The y-axis refers to the group average mean firm-level hourly wage, expressed with respect to
the pre-reform (2012) level. Bottom and top 50% are defined within cells, where cells are defined as a
unique combination of the proportion of wage bill accruing to workers making less than 2.2 and less
than 2.8 MW (both variables are discretized through truncation into 31 values), 3-digit sector and size
(4 categories) Source: MVC, DADS 2009-2015.
where Yit is the wage of firms i at time t, Zi is the predicted reduction in labor costs
defined in equation (3), and 1{t ≥ 2013} is the post treatment indicator variable. The
coefficient β can be interpreted as a semi-elasticity of the variable Yi,t relative to the tax
credit rate. Xi,t−1 is a vector of lagged observable controls that will be progressively
included in the specification. The vector contains the lagged share of employees paid
less than 1.5 MW as another policy targeting these employees was implemented in
2015, the lagged value of assets (in log), and the lagged productivity (in log). We
include these controls in order to gauge the robustness of our results to the role of po-
tential confounders but they do not play an important role in the identification of the
effect of interest. The term αi refers to a firm fixed-effect while αc,t is a cell× year fixed
effect defined above. The inclusion of cells × year fixed effects implies that (1) we
are comparing ex ante similar firms, as they have a similar pre-reform wage distribu-
tion, are in the same industry and the same size group and that (2) the common trend
assumption needs only to hold within-cell. Indeed, the interaction of cells indicators
with year dummies allows to controls for cell-specific time trends. Indeed, firms with
different skill mixes, of different sizes or belonging to different industries can be differ-
ently affected by business cycle fluctuations (Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, 2012). This
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procedure is standard in the literature on firm-level evaluation of tax policy (Yagan,
2015).
Additionally, we implement event-study regressions to check whether the common
trend assumption holds. The exogenous treatment intensity is interacted with a full
set of year dummies (omitting the pre-reform year):
ln(Yi,t) = αi + αc,t +
∑
d6=2012
βd × Zi1{d = t}+X ′i,t−1γ + εi,t (5)
Finding pre-reform βd coefficients that are not significantly different from zero and
follow a stable path would support the common trend assumption. Post-reform βd
coefficients will reflect how the effect of the policy builds up after the reform.
Assessing the validity of the research design
To test how this method matches firms with similar wage structures, we compare the
wage distribution of firms more or less intensely treated. We plot the wage distribution
of two categories of firms: those with treatment intensity under or above (i) the full
sample median (Figure 10, left panel) or (ii) the within cell median (Figure 10, right
panel). On the left panel, the wage distributions outside the 2.2-2.8 MW window are
different, with most treated firms counting on average more low-wage employees.
On the opposite, the two groups of the right panel have a similar wage distribution
outside the 2.2-2.8 MW window, and only differ in wage structure within that window.
It therefore demonstrates that our cells fixed effects successfully group firms that have
very similar wage distributions even beyond the points on which we match, while
exhibiting differences in the repartition of wages immediately around the cutoff, thus
creating variation in the treatment intensity.
Our method aims at exploiting variation in treatment intensity that stems from
local differences in the wage distribution of firms with otherwise similar production
profiles. Hence, conditional on cell fixed-effects, there should be no ex ante correla-
tion between treatment and firms’ observable characteristics. To test this, we com-
pute these correlations, first unconditionally, then conditioning on sector × size fixed-
effects and, finally, conditioning on cell fixed-effects. They are computed for 2012, the
year prior the reform, and for the following firm observables: the value added per
worker (V A/L)i, the value of assets (Assetsi) and the share of the wage bill below 1.5
MW (Sh1.5MWi). Results are shown in Table 4. While controlling for sector fixed-
effects barely affects the correlation between covariates and treatment, the inclusion of
cells fixed-effects is, in contrast, very effective at reducing that correlation. It confirms
that ex ante treatment intensity is as good as random within cells.
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Figure 10: Within-firm wage distribution for firms above and below median of treat-
ment intensity where the median is defined globally (left panel) and within cells×
sector × size category (right panel)
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Note: The left panel displays the average wage bill CDF of firms depending on whether they lie above
or below the median of the treatment intensity where the median is defined for the entire sample. The
right panel does the same thing, except that the median is now defined within category (cell × 3-digit
industry × size). The sample is here restricted to firms for which more than 30% of wage bill accrue to
workers paid between 2.2 and 2.8 MW. Red vertical lines refers to 2.2 and 2.8 MW.
Table 4: Within-cell correlation between treatment intensity and covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sector × Size
Statistic Sample # firms Uncondit. FEs Cells FEs
ρ(Zi, lnAssetsi) all 325,329 -0.161 -0.096 -0.003
ρ(Zi, ln(V Ai/Li)) all 325,329 -0.336 -0.280 -0.007
ρ(Zi, Sh1.5MWi) all 325,329 0.604 0.507 0.000
ρ(Zi, lnAssetsi) % WB ≥ 30% 30,089 -0.054 -0.023 -0.006
ρ(Zi, ln(V Ai/Li)) % WB ≥ 30% 30,089 -0.187 -0.181 -0.025
ρ(Zi, Sh1.5MWi) % WB ≥ 30% 30,089 0.353 0.316 0.011
ρ(Zi, lnAssetsi) % WB ≥ 50% 8,130 -0.017 -0.033 -0.030
ρ(Zi, ln(V Ai/Li)) % WB ≥ 50% 8,130 -0.079 -0.097 -0.041
ρ(Zi, Sh1.5MWi) % WB ≥ 50% 8,130 0.179 0.228 0.019
Note: Cells are defined as a unique combination of the proportion of wage bill accruing to workers
making less than 2.2 and less than 2.8 MW (both variables are discretized through truncation into
31 values). ρ(Zi, Xi) is the coefficient of correlation between the instrument for treatment intensity
Zi and the firm’s characteristics Xi in 2012. “% WB > x” refers to a sample restriction to firms
whose share of the wage bill constituted of wages between 2.2 and 2.8MW is above x. Column (4)
show unconditional correlations. Column (5) shows the correlation between the two variables after
absorbing 3-digit sector × size FEs. Column (6) shows the correlation between the same variables
after absorbing sector × size × cells FEs.
Obviously, a cost of within-cell estimation is that the average difference in ex ante
exposure to CICE is lower. We check that absorbing cells fixed effects leaves enough
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treatment intensity variation across firms for several subsamples. Results are pre-
sented in Table 5. Although cells do account for a large share of the variation in treat-
ment intensity across firms in the full sample, a substantial share remains within cells
for firms with a high share of workers in the window. The standard deviation of treat-
ment intensity is greater than 1% (for a maximum possible treatment intensity of 6%)
and within cells variation is substantial: about 50% (respectively 70%) of the variance
when restricting to the sample of firms with at least 30% (respectively 50%) of the wage
bill between 2.2 and 2.8 MW.
Table 5: Between/within cell variation in treatment
Statistic Sample # firms Std deviation Between Cells Within Cells
Vˆ(Zi) all 325,329 0.0094 92.0% 8.0%
Vˆ(Zi) % WB > 0.3 30,089 0.0107 50.2% 49.8%
Vˆ(Zi) % WB > 0.5 8,130 0.0120 27.6% 72.4%
Note: Cells are defined as a unique combination of the proportion of wage bill accruing to work-
ers making less than 2.2 and less than 2.8 MW (both variables are discretized through truncation
into 31 values), the size category and the sector of activity (3-digit). “% WB> x” refers to a sample
restriction to firms whose share of the wage bill constituted of wages between 2.2 and 2.8MW is
above x.
We have so far shown (1) that cells effectively group firms with similar wage dis-
tributions outside the 2.2-2.8 MW but with substantial differences in the repartition of
wages around this cutoff, (2) that including cells vastly reduces pre-reform correlation
with counfounding factors, showing that within-firm variation is as good as random,
and (3) that this methodology not only isolates likely random variations, but also pre-
serves substantial within-cell variation in treatment intensity, necessary to identify the
wage incidence of the tax credit under study.
It should be noted at this point that given our methodology, our estimates are local
as firms with no employee paid between 2.2 and 2.8 MW do not serve for the identifi-
cation. However, the focus on variation in the exposure to the policy driven by local
differences in wage distribution around the discontinuity is necessary to identify the
causal impact of the CICE and to obtain consistent estimates.
5.2 Results
In this section, we present the results of the impact of the CICE on wages at the firm-
level. They indicate that wages increased relatively more in firms relatively more ex-
posed to the CICE after the implementation of the scheme. It contrasts with the ab-
sence of incidence at the employee-level around the 2.5 MW eligibility threshold de-
scribed previously. We first present the baseline estimation results, which stem from
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the implementation of our within cell double difference estimation strategy. We then
present the results of an event study analysis which aims at assessing the validity of
the common trend assumption. We finally show that our results are robust to alterna-
tive size of grids, to alternative windows of estimations, to alternative definitions of
predicted treatment intensity and to a placebo test.
Baseline results
The results of the impact of the CICE on firm-level wages are presented in Table 6.
The dependent variable is the mean hourly wages of full-time workers. The first three
columns of the table correspond to the full sample, the next three columns to the subset
of firms with at least 30% of their wage bill accruing to workers paid between 2.2 and
2.8 MW and the last three columns to the subset of firms with at least 50% of their wage
bill in this window. In columns (1), (4) and (7), regressions include years 2009-2015,
columns (2), (5) and (8) rely on years 2010-2015 and columns (3), (6) and (9) include
lagged time varying controls at the firm-level. Results reported here correspond to
cells-length of 3.33 percentage points of wage bill cumulative function (31 points grid).
All regressions include cells interacted to years fixed and firm fixed effects.
Table 6: Impact on hourly wage: DiD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Zi × 1{t ≥ 2013} 0.454*** 0.455*** 0.431*** 0.529*** 0.515*** 0.486*** 0.668*** 0.663*** 0.647***
(0.0758) (0.0735) (0.0687) (0.0942) (0.0914) (0.0854) (0.137) (0.133) (0.124)
Observations 806735 695259 679082 154310 133200 129296 41451 35759 34456
R2 0.910 0.920 0.925 0.819 0.834 0.845 0.723 0.740 0.760
Window defining cells (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8)
% WB in window 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5
Width Cells .033 .033 .033 .033 .033 .033 .033 .033 .033
Lagged Controls
√ √ √
# firms 121597 121533 120448 23601 23588 23334 6361 6358 6270
Note: Reported coefficients are for the treatment intensity variable interacted with a post-2013 dummy
as presented in Equation (4). Each regression includes lagged controls, firm fixed-effects and a set of
cells × year fixed-effects. Cells are defined as the interaction of di
Cells are defined as a unique combination of the proportion of wage bill accruing to workers making less
than 2.2 and less than 2.8 times the minimum wage (both variables are discretized through truncation
into 31 values), 3-digit sector and size (4 categories). Lagged controls includes (log of) value-added per
workers, asset value and the 2012 share of wage-bill accrued to workers earning below 1.5 times the
minimum wage interacted with a full set of year dummies. The baseline sample includes firms in the
for-profit sector present in FARE, DADS and MVC files that are observed for the entire period (balanced
sample). The number of observations do not include firms in cells where the variation of the treatment
is null.
Robust standard errors in parentheses (firm-level cluster), * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Sources:
DADS, FARE, MVC 2009-2015.
The results point to a positive and significant impact of the CICE on wages at
the firm-level. Estimates are stable when the number of years included in the panel
changes (column 2), or when lagged observable characteristics at the firm-level are
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included (column 3). The coefficients also remain significant and close in magnitude
when we restrict the estimation sample to firms with a larger share of their workers
paid in the 2.2 to 2.8 MW window (respectively 30% and 50% in columns 4 to 9). This
suggests that our methodology can successfully isolate variation in treatment inten-
sity that comes from the CICE policy. In our central specification (column 9), we find
that exogenously receiving an amount of tax credit equivalent to 1% of the wage bill
translates into a 0.65% increase in average wages at the firm level.
Overall, the magnitude of the coefficients suggests that about half of the CICE was
transferred to workers through wage increases. This result is in line with previous
estimates in the literature on the incidence of corporate income tax. Liu and Altshuler
(2013) study the US case thanks to cross-industries analysis, Arulampalam et al. (2012)
investigate the European setting thanks to a cross-country panel analysis, Fuest et al.
(2018) analyze the corporate income tax in Germany, thanks to a cross-municipality
panel analysis while Dwenger et al. (2011) use a quasi-natural experiment based on
heterogeneous impacts of a reform decreasing the CIT rate and broadening the base
in Germany. Interestingly, despite obvious differences in the context, design of the
policy and method implemented to estimate the effects, all estimates are very close
and indicate that about 50% of variation in corporate income tax is transmitted to
employees through changes in wages.
Event study analysis
To complement our within cells double difference estimations, we also implement an
event study analysis as described in equation (5). It has two purposes: first to assess
the validity of the common trend assumption and second to understand how the wage
effect of the CICE unfolds over time. This event study, which is presented in Figure
11, mirrors the double difference specification of column (9) in Table 6. It presents
the evolution, each year, of the point estimates and the associated confidence intervals
(vertical bars) of the difference in mean hourly wages between more or less treated
firms. Because our exogenous treatment intensity is time invariant and our specifi-
cation includes firm fixed effects and time fixed effects, we normalize one of the β
coefficients. We choose to set β2012 to 0, as it is the last year before the introduction of
the CICE. It implies that preceding and subsequent coefficients should be interpreted
as a log difference in mean wages across more or less treated firms with respect to
the year 2012. As explained above, the common trend assumption is valid only if the
pre-reform β coefficients are not significantly different from zero.
Results indicated that there is no difference in wages between more or less treated
firms before the introduction of the CICE as pre-reform estimates are not significantly
different from zero. This confirms the validity of the common trend assumption on
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Figure 11: Effect of the reform on firm-level average wage: central specification
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Note: The figure presents point estimates correponding to Equation (5), including lagged controls, and
estimated using the sample of firms with more than 50% of their wage bill accruing to workers in the
(2.2, 2.8) window. 95% confidence intervals are displayed. 2012, the last pre-reform year, is used as the
reference year, and the point estimate is equal to 0 by construction. Regressions include cells × size ×
sector × year fixed-effects. Cells are defined as a unique combination of the proportion of wage bill
accruing to workers making less than 2.2 and less than 2.8 times the minimum wage (both variables
are discretized through truncation into 31 categories), 3-digit sector and size category (4 values). The
lagged controls are the following: the (log of) value-added per workers, asset value and the 2012 share
of wage-bill accrued to workers earning below 1.5 times the minimum wage interacted with a full set
of year dummies. Sources: DADS, FARE, MVC 2009-2015.
which relies our estimation strategy. Turning to post-reform estimates, coefficients
become significantly positive in 2013, and increase in 2014 and 2015, possibly because
the rate of tax credit changed from 4% to 6%.
Overall, our baseline results suggest that the CICE has a positive impact on wages
at the firm-level and that its effect gradually gained in magnitude. We now turn to an
assessment of the robustness of these results.
Alternative size of grids
As explained above, an important novelty of our estimation is strategy is to compare
firms within cells. Yet, we made a number of choices to define cells and it is crucial
to carry out a sensitivity analysis. A first potential concern relates to the size of grids
used to assign group of firms in different cells depending on their wage distribution.
To test the robustness of our results to changes in the size of grids, we reproduce our
event study regression for larger cell (21 points grid) and smaller cells (51 points grids),
including controls or not in the regressions. Such results in the form of event study are
presented in panel a. of figure 13 while results of difference in difference estimations
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with 21 and 51 point grids are presented in the Appendix (see Tables A3 and A4).
As expected, pre-reform coefficients remain non significant while wage difference be-
tween more or less exposed firms to the CICE become positive and significant after
2013 in all specifications. Our results are therefore robust to alternative size of grids
and cells.
Figure 12: Wage impact of the CICE, alternative size of cells
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Lagged controls, 51-pt grid
No Controls, 21-pt grid
Lagged controls, 21-pt grid
Note: The figure plots coefficients from Equation (5). 95 % confidence interval are displayed. The last
pre-reform year, 2012, is used as a reference point. Regressions include cells × 3-digit sector × size (4
categories)× year fixed-effects. Cells are defined as a unique combination of the (coarsened) proportion
of wage bill accruing to workers making less than 2.2 and less than 2.8 times the minimum wage. The
panel (a) displays results for firms with more than 50% of the wage bill located the (2.2 MW,2.8 MW)
window for two different grids used in the discretization of the wage bill share of workers below 2.2 and
2.8 MW and with and without observable controls. The panel (b) displays results for different samples
of firms in the wage bill share in the window (see legend) and a tighter window (2.3, 2.7) around around
the 2.5 MW threshold. Lagged controls includes (log of) value-added per workers, asset value and the
2012 share of wage-bill accrued to workers earning below 1.5 times the minimum wage interacted with
a full set of year dummies. Sources: DADS, FARE, MVC 2009-2015.
Alternative window of estimations
A second potential concern lies in the choice of estimation windows. We therefore
test alternative specifications regarding the width of the window around the 2.5 MW
threshold: we compare point estimates when cells and estimations windows are de-
fined with respect to 2.2-2.8 MW, or with respect to 2.3-2.7 MW. We also impose or not
sample restrictions, by using either all firms, or only those with at least 50% of their
wage bill comprised in these respective windows. The results are presented in panel
b. of figure 13 while results of difference in difference estimations are presented in the
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Appendix (see Tables A5, A6 and A7). Pre-reform coefficients remain not significantly
different from zero, and post reform coefficients remain overall significant with mag-
nitudes similar to the ones of the baseline specifications. These tests therefore confirm
the robustness of our results to changes in the window of estimation and to sample
restrictions.
Figure 13: Wage impact of the CICE, alternative estimation windows
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Grid on window [2.3,2.7] - more than 50% in window
Note: The figure plots coefficients from Equation (5). 95 % confidence interval are displayed. The last
pre-reform year, 2012, is used as a reference point. Regressions include cells × 3-digit sector × size (4
categories)× year fixed-effects. Cells are defined as a unique combination of the (coarsened) proportion
of wage bill accruing to workers making less than 2.2 and less than 2.8 times the minimum wage. The
panel (a) displays results for firms with more than 50% of the wage bill located the (2.2 MW,2.8 MW)
window for two different grids used in the discretization of the wage bill share of workers below 2.2 and
2.8 MW and with and without observable controls. The panel (b) displays results for different samples
of firms in the wage bill share in the window (see legend) and a tighter window (2.3, 2.7) around around
the 2.5 MW threshold. Lagged controls includes (log of) value-added per workers, asset value and the
2012 share of wage-bill accrued to workers earning below 1.5 times the minimum wage interacted with
a full set of year dummies. Sources: DADS, FARE, MVC 2009-2015.
Treatment intensity based on other years
A third potential concern lies in the year of reference to compute exogenous predicted
treatment intensity. Indeed, as explained supra, we initially defined it as the amount of
tax credit a firm would have been entitled to claim given its pre-reform wage bill. In
other words, we compute the ratio of the sum of wages below 2.5 MW to the total wage
bill in 2012, and scale it given the policy rate. However, it could be that this year was
rather atypical (Europe was in the middle of the Debt Crisis), and hardly reflected true
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firms’ characteristics. In alternative definitions, we construct the exogenous treatment
based on the 2010 wage bill, as well as a mean of 2011 and 2012 wage bills. Event-study
estimation results are presented in figure 14 while difference-in-difference estimation
results can be found in tables A8 and A9.
Figure 14: Effect of the reform on firm-level average wage for alternative treatment
instruments
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Lagged controls, Treatement defined based on 2011-2012 wages; + 30% wage bill in window
Treatement defined based on 2010 wages; + 50% wage bill in window
Treatement defined based on 2011-2012 wages; + 50% wage bill in window
Note: The figure plots coefficients from Equation (5) when the ex ante exposure to the policy is computed
based on different base years: 2010, or an average of 2010 to 2012 in instead of 2012 in the baseline spec-
ification. 95 % confidence interval are displayed. The last pre-reform year, 2012, is used as a reference
point. Regressions include cells × size (4 categories) × 3-digit sector × year fixed-effects. Cells are
defined as a unique combination of the coarsened proportion of wage bill accruing to workers making
less than 2.2 and less than 2.8 times the minimum wage. Lagged controls includes (log of) value-added
per workers, asset value and the 2012 share of wage-bill accrued to workers earning below 1.5 times the
minimum wage interacted with a full set of year dummies. Sources: DADS, FARE, MVC 2009-2015.
Reassuringly, pre-reform coefficients remain non significant. Post reform coeffi-
cients are not significant in 2013 but remain positive and significant in 2014 and 2015
when the rate of tax credit increases from 4% to 6%.
Overall all these robustness checks confirm that the CICE has had a positive impact
on wages at the firm level and that our results are not sensitive to the definition of cells,
window of estimations, sample restrictions, and definition of treatment intensity. A
remaining question is whether our results are affected by confounding factors.
Placebo test
In order to further test the robustness of our results against the presence of potential
confounding factors, we finally implement a placebo test. It consists in replacing the
actual eligibility threshold at 2.5 MW by a virtual one at 3.1 MW, and by comparing
31
firms just above and just below this threshold in the 2.8-3.4 window. The rational for
choosing this cutoff is to be sufficiently low so that there remains local variation in
wages between firms around the threshold while not interfering with our previous es-
timation window. If the incidence on wages highlighted previously is caused only by
the introduction of the CICE, there should be no significant difference in the evolution
of wages between firms in these two groups after 2013.
Figure 15: Effect of the reform on firm-level average wage: placebo test
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Note: Placebo treatment is defined as an ex-ante exposure to policy based on 2012 wage distribution as
if the eligibility threshold was 3.1 MW instead of 2.5 and the cells are defined as a unique combination
of the proportion of wage bill accruing to workers making less than 2.8 and less than 3.4 times the
minimum wage (both variables are coarsened through truncation into 11, 21 or 31 values). As in other
tables, regressions include cells × 3-digit sector × size (4 categories) × year fixed-effects. As there is no
policy matching the threshold one would expect no effect. Results are displayed for different fineness
of the grid used for the discretization of the wage bill share of workers below 2.8 and 3.4 MW. Estimates
based on the sample if firms with at leasr 50% of their wage bill accruing to workers in the window
(2.8,3.4 MW) window. Sources: DADS, FARE, MVC 2009-2015.
Results indicate that in this case, coefficients are not different from zero pre-reform,
but more importantly, not different reform post reform. This suggests that all the ef-
fect we capture is well link to the differences in wages distribution around the 2.5
MW. Given that this threshold is specific to the CICE, this considerably reduces the
possibility that our results be biased by confounding factors.
Overall, our results so far suggest that the absence of incidence at the employee
level according to the individual eligibility status hides a substantial collective inci-
dence at the firm -level. This result meets those found by Saez et al. (2018) in the con-
text of Sweden, where payroll tax cuts on young workers seem to have induced wage
increase for all workers independently from their eligibility status. Note that such type
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of incidence would not be detectable with an employee-level analysis which suggests
the importance of methods on the assessment of incidence.
5.3 Heterogenous impact of CICE on wages
In the previous section, we have documented that about half of the corporate income
tax credit presently studied translated into higher wages, in line with the corporate
income tax incidence literature. However, this positive average effect on wage may
hide heterogeneity across types of firms or workers. First, incidence on wages may
depend on firm characteristics: marginal rent sharing should depend on the amount
of surplus firms can actually share with their employees. We therefore test the impact
of ex ante profitability. Moreover, the incidence on wages is likely to vary according
to employees characteristics, particularly their bargaining power. We therefore test
whether wage incidence differs by socioprofessional category.
Effect of the CICE on wages according to firm profitability
Wage incidence of the tax credit is likely to depend on a firm’s profitability. As wage
incidence results from a sharing of the policy benefit (or burden) with the employees,
less profitable firms might be less keen on sharing the tax credit with their employees,
if for instance, they are more in need to restore their margin. To test this hypothesis,
we interact our treatment intensity with a dummy variable indicating whether a firm
is profitable or not. Firms are considered profitable when they have strictly positive
taxable profits in the three pre-reform years. The results are presented in Table 7 for
different restrictions in the estimation sample.
As expected, results indicate that profitability indeed plays a role, as wage inci-
dence is significantly larger in more profitable firms. However, though lower, the
wage incidence also occured in non-profitable firms.
Impact of the CICE on wages according to the CSP
Previous results suggests that firms share the tax credit with their employees inde-
pendently from their individual eligibility. Nevertheless, wage incidence may vary
according to employees characteristics, in particular their bargaining power. To test
this hypothesis we carry out the estimations of the CICE impact at firm-level sepa-
rately for high skill and low skill workers, making the assumption that they exhibit
different bargaining power. In order to do so, we split the French scale of sociopro-
fessional category – informed in the DADS database – between two groups: low skill
and high skill. High skill corresponds to executives, intellectual and intermediate oc-
cupations (skill levels 3 and 4 of the ILO classification). Low skill correspond blue
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Table 7: Impact of CICE on wages, impact of firm profitability
Share of wage bill in the estimation window [2.2,2.8]
all firms > 30% > 50%
Impact of the CICE policy for non-profitable firms 0.273*** 0.191** 0.299**
(0.067) (0.090) (0.143)
Additional impact for profitable firms 0.061*** 0.143*** 0.149***
(0.005) (0.016) (0.035)
Observations 737,156 140,930 36,559
R2 0.924 0.846 0.756
Note: Reported coefficients are for the treatment intensity variable interacted with a post-2013 dummy
as presented in Equation (4). Each regression includes lagged controls, firm fixed-effects and a set of
cells × year fixed-effects. Cells are defined as the interaction of di
Cells are defined as a unique combination of the proportion of wage bill accruing to workers making less
than 2.2 and less than 2.8 times the minimum wage (both variables are discretized through truncation
into 31 values), 3-digit sector and size (4 categories). Lagged controls includes (log of) value-added per
workers, asset value and the 2012 share of wage-bill accrued to workers earning below 1.5 times the
minimum wage interacted with a full set of year dummies. The baseline sample includes firms in the
for-profit sector present in FARE, DADS and MVC files that are observed for the entire period (balanced
sample). The number of observations do not include firms in cells where the variation of the treatment
is null.
Robust standard errors in parentheses (firm-level cluster), * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Sources:
DADS, FARE, MVC 2009-2015.
collar and other employees (skill levels 1 and 2 of the ILO classification). The results
are displayed in Table 8 for the baseline specification.
Table 8: Impact of CICE on wages by skill level, DiD
Share of wage bill in the estimation window [2.2,2.8]
all firms > 30% > 50% all firms > 30% > 50%
Low skill workers High skill workers
CICE policy -0.047 -0.048 -0.087 0.437*** 0.420*** 0.605***
(0.078) (0.103) (0.163) (0.102) (0.118) (0.157)
Observations 616,093 99,010 23,379 528,764 91,246 23,245
R2 0.888 0.870 0.869 0.866 0.826 0.765
Note: Reported coefficients are for the treatment intensity variable interacted with a post-2013 dummy
as presented in Equation (4). Each regression includes lagged controls, firm fixed-effects and a set of
cells × year fixed-effects. Cells are defined as the interaction of di
Cells are defined as a unique combination of the proportion of wage bill accruing to workers making less
than 2.2 and less than 2.8 times the minimum wage (both variables are discretized through truncation
into 31 values), 3-digit sector and size (4 categories). Lagged controls includes (log of) value-added per
workers, asset value and the 2012 share of wage-bill accrued to workers earning below 1.5 times the
minimum wage interacted with a full set of year dummies. The baseline sample includes firms in the
for-profit sector present in FARE, DADS and MVC files that are observed for the entire period (balanced
sample). The number of observations do not include firms in cells where the variation of the treatment
is null.
Robust standard errors in parentheses (firm-level cluster), * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Sources:
DADS, FARE, MVC 2009-2015.
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This analysis provides clear-cut results: while coefficients for low-skill workers are
close to zero and non significant, the wage incidence for high-skill workers is strongly
significant. As previously, we also run event studies in order to assess the validity
of the common trends assumption and to uncover post reform dynamics. Figure 16
shows the baseline specification.
Figure 16: Impact of CICE on wages by skill level, event study
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Note: The figure presents point estimates correponding to Equation (5), including lagged controls, and
estimated using the sample of firms with more than 50% of their wage bill accruing to workers in the
(2.2, 2.8) window. 95% confidence intervals are displayed. 2012, the last pre-reform year, is used as the
reference year, and the point estimate is equal to 0 by construction. Regressions include cells × size ×
sector × year fixed-effects. Cells are defined as a unique combination of the proportion of wage bill
accruing to workers making less than 2.2 and less than 2.8 times the minimum wage (both variables
are discretized through truncation into 31 categories), 3-digit sector and size category (4 values). The
lagged controls are the following: the (log of) value-added per workers, asset value and the 2012 share
of wage-bill accrued to workers earning below 1.5 times the minimum wage interacted with a full set
of year dummies. Sources: DADS, FARE, MVC 2009-2015.
These event studies confirm the robustness of the results: the pre-reform point
estimates are not significant and close to zero for the two groups, which validates the
common trend assumption. Then, the post-reform point estimates stay close to zero
and are not significant for low-skill but grow to a significantly positive level for high-
skill. The CICE translated in wages increases only for high-skill workers. This pattern
is consistent with the surplus-sharing hypothesis, as employees with a higher socio-
professionnal status are likely to have more bargaining power, allowing them to get a
larger share of the surplus. This meets the results of Kline et al. (2018) using a different
shock in the rent to share: they show that the incidence of patent-induced surplus on
wages are concentrated among workers at the top half of the earnings distribution.
Interestingly, high-skill worker are less likely than low-skill to contribute to the
eligibility of the firm to the CICE as they are less likely to be paid below 2.5 MW (see
Figure 2). These findings suggest that there was sizable spillovers of the policy from
the eligible workers to those not necessarily eligible due to rent sharing at the firm
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level. They also indicate that the CICE policy has had in the French case stark anti
redistributive effect as the tax credit targeted the lowest part of the wage earners but
benefited to employees earning higher wages.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we take advantage of a large corporate tax credit (CICE), introduced in
France in 2013, to shed new light on the wage incidence of corporate taxation. The
CICE is proportional to the wage bill of workers paid below a hourly wage thresh-
old (2.5MW). This induces a discontinuity in mandatory levies at the employee level.
Hence, we first implement an employee-level identification strategy to assess the wage
incidence of the CICE. In addition, the scheme generates substantial difference in treat-
ment intensity between very similar firms, depending on the number of employees
just above or just under the 2.5MW threshold. Hence, we also develop an identifica-
tion strategy at the firm level based on treatment discontinuity at the employee level,
to asses firm-level wage incidence of the CICE. We are therefore able to contrast wage
incidence at employee and firm levels for the same reform – in the same economic and
institutional environment – on the same economic agents.
Our results demonstrate the absence of wage incidence at the employee level con-
trasting with a substantial wage incidence at the firm level (about 50% of the tax credit
is shifted into wages). This means that the corporate tax credit is actually shared with
the employees, independently from their individual eligibility. This highlights that in-
dividual strategies of identification do not provide the comprehensive picture of wage
incidence, as collective rent-sharing cannot be detected.
Though collective, wage incidence may be heterogeneous between groups of work-
ers. We actually demonstrate that the CICE wage incidence falls only on high skill
workers. Low skill workers, despite more likely to be eligible, did not benefit from
wage increases caused by the CICE. This highlights the anti-redistributive impact of
this corporate tax credit.
Both these results highlight the importance of within firm wage bargaining for as-
sessing corporate tax incidence and its distributional aftermath. This adds another mo-
tivation for further analyzing the impact of workers’ characteristics (such as scarcity
or substitutability of the skills) or labor market institutions (such as the level of decen-
tralization or the degree of unionization) on wage setting.
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A Data appendix
A.1 Details on databases
The present empirical analysis is based on three administrative databases, built from
firm returns to the tax agency (DGFiP, the French General Directorate for Public Fi-
nance) and from firm returns to the institution responsible to collect social contribu-
tion (ACOSS). Furthermore, the DGFiP has computed since the reform a firm-level
database informing the amount and use of the CICE (MVC database). It also pro-
vides, in association with the French statistical agency (INSEE) a database on firms
accounting (FARE database). ACOSS provides in association with Insee a database on
workers and wages at the contract level (DADS database). We were given access to
these databases for the years 2009 to 2015.
A.1.1 MVC database
DGFiP specifically built the MVC files informing the firms’ initializations of CICE
rights. This database, whose first vintage is 2013, gathers information for all firms
benefiting from the CICE. For each firm, details are provided regarding: initialization,
the amount of tax credit to which the firm is entitled, initialized on its tax returns; in-
crease, upward adjustments given the evolution of the firm’s wage structure; decrease,
similar downward adjustments; imputation, the amount of CICE that firms were able
to deduct from their CIT. These variables allow us to understand the CICE distribu-
tion. For a given year, the eventual amount of CICE claimed by a firm for a given year
is equal to initialization plus increase minus decrease. We do not use the actual year of
imputation.
A.1.2 FARE database
General information on the production structure of firms, income statement and balance-
sheet are presented in the FARE database of the ESANE system (annual business statis-
tics). It is built by Insee on the basis of the tax data, social declarations and a survey19.
This database covers all firms (including firms without employees) with the exception
of the financial sector and farms. We use it to control for firm characteristics, in terms
of workforce, productivity (value added per employee) and capital stock (tangible and
intangible assets).20
19The purpose of the survey questionnaire is to produce structural business statistics; it should be
noted that the questionnaire sent to firms was amended in 2011. However, the variables we use are
extracted from the tax data
20Note that information on profits is also available but is not sufficiently reliable to be used as a
dependent variable because firms can account differently for CICE (as a deduction of labor costs, as
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While all other databases are defined at the firm-level (with the SIREN number
identifying them), the FARE files compute combinations for some of them, which is
called profiling. Indeed, some major groups have transformed parts of their produc-
tion chain into independent legal units, while decisions remain at the central level. In
order to provide a better overview of the productive structure, Insee gathers different
legal units (with different SIREN numbers) into a single entity – profiled firm. Among
the profiled firms, six are present in the database only at the group level (the six histor-
ical profiled firms) while the data on the others are given at both the group and legal
unit levels (a hundred of profiled firms). For those latter firms we consider only the
individual legal units for all databases. For the six historical profiled firms, we profile
the other databases in order to have employement, wages and CICE data at the group
level and be able to match the databases.
A.1.3 DADS database
The annual social data declaration (DADS) files contain information on each salaried
contract in each firm: net and gross wages, working time, socioprofessional categories,
type of contract, sex of the employee, etc. There is one observation per contract for
each firm and employee. Thus, the same employee can be found several times in the
dataset if she has contracts with several firms. In addition, it is important to know that
DADS are presented in the form of regional files and that observations concerning
employees of a firm located in one region but living in another one are present in the
regional files of the two regions. A first work before starting the analysis therefore
consisted in excluding double counts from these databases.
Moreover, for each item, the values of the variables are also given for the previous
year. This makes it possible to construct changes in the variables from one year to the
next for each item. Indeed, the identifiers of the contracts are not recognizable from
one vintage to the other and it is therefore not possible to build a panel of contracts. On
the other hand, the firm identifiers are the SIRENs, stable over time, and we therefore
constitute panels of firms. Thus, as far as wage increases are concerned, we have
operated in two ways, depending on the level of the analysis. At the employee-level,
we consider the distribution of wages of new hires on the one hand and the growth
rate of the hourly wage for employees with a permanent contracts staying in the same
firm two consecutive years on the other hand. At the firm-level, in order to capture
the changes due to wages variations only – and not due to variation in the structure
of employment in the firm – we have calculated mean wage of full time permanent
contracts only.
operating subsidies, other operating income or CIT deduction). Thus, the various measures of profit
(EBIT, EBITDA, operating income) may or may not take into account the CICE depending on the firm.
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Pay data is accurate in that it is at the job level, but relatively imprecise as to what
it covers. Gross remuneration includes “all remuneration received by the employee
under her contract of employment, before deducting compulsory contributions”. For
instance, it includes bonuses for end of fixed-term contracts (corresponding to 10% of
the amount received during the contract). This could have led to biases in the obser-
vation of hourly wage growth since these bonuses inflate the total gross earnings for
the contract year but not the number of hours worked. To tackle this, we focus in the
empirical analysis on the mean wage of permanent contracts only. Moreover, we are
able to predict very precisely the CICE firms can claim, meaning that these data are
very reliable for the purpose of our study.
In order to carry out our identification strategy, it is necessary to be able to measure
the CICE to which a firm would have been entitled before the reform implementation,
based on its productive structure. However, this is not possible on the basis of actual
tax data, which did not collect such information prior to 2013. The DADS database
allows us to approach these values thanks to the precision on wage structure of firms.
It is indeed possible to calculate the share of wage bill below 2.5 MW, and to compute
a potential CICE.21 This calculation for the years 2013 to 2015 of predicted CICE (given
past wage structure) is very close to the amounts of CICE actually initialized with the
tax departments and presented in the MVC database.
A.2 Description of variables used in the analysis
Employee-level analysis:
1. Hourly wage variable: we define hourly wage as the ratio of gross earnings
(salaire brut) over worked hours in a given job (nombre d’heures).
2. New hire: Hires are defined as jobs starting in February or later at year t taken
up by workers not employed in the same firm at t−1. Firms with no employment
at year t− 1 are excluded.
3. Stayers: Stayers are defined as workers in permanent contract working full-time
(32 hours per week or more) who kept the same occupation within the same firm
between t and t− 1.
Firm-level analysis:
1. Occupation variable: we define low-skill workers as those whose occupation
(variable CS) is documented in DADS database as employee (employe´) and blue
21Similar wage structure indicators can also be built at other thresholds (1.5 MW in particular) in
order to better approximate the distribution of wage in the firms.
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collar (ouvrier) occupations, we define high-skill workers as those whose occu-
pation is documented as intermediary occupations (professions interme´diaires) or
executives and intellectual occupations (cadres et professions intellectuelles).
2. Average hourly wage at the firm level: this variable is equal to the ratio of the
sum of the gross wages accruing to workers in permanent contract (contrat a` dure´e
inde´termine´e) to the sum of worked hours for the same set of workers. We defined
low and high skill mean wage analogously (DADS).
3. Actual treatment intensity: the ratio of the amount of CICE claimed to the tax
services and recorded in the MVC database over the sum of gross wages (DADS).
4. Instrument for treatment intensity: the instrument of exposure intensity is the
CICE rate times the ratio of the sum of gross wages accruing to workers whose
hourly wage is between .85 and 2.5 MW over the sum of overall gross wages
(DADS).
5. Grid variable: We compute for each firm the share of the wage bill below 2.2
MW and below 2.8 MW in 2012 (alternative specification with 2.3 and 2.7MW
points), the year prior the reform (DADS). We discretize these variables ranging
from 0% to 100% with a step of 3.33 percentage points (alternative specification
with steps of 2 and 5 percentage points). The interaction of these two variables
yields the grid.
6. Sectoral variable: The sectoral variable is the variable APEN (DADS) document-
ing the main activity of the firm through a 3-digit classification.
7. Size variable: The size variable takes on 3 values and is defined based on the
full-time equivalent employment variable (DADS). The three values are defined
as follows: 1– less than 50, 2– between 50 and 250 ,3– 250 or more.
8. Cell variables: The cell variable is the interaction of grid, sectoral and size vari-
ables.
9. Control variables: We include 3 main lagged control variable (1) share of em-
ployees paid less than 1.5 MW (DADS) , (2) the log value of assets (valeur des
immobilisations in FARE), and (3) the log productivity (value-added over average
employment in FARE).
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A.3 Descriptive statistics of the subsamples
Table A1: Subsamples of analysis (2012)
All > 30% > 50%
Employment and wage
# of employees 64.36 25.36 10.67
# of white-collars 12.52 11.12 4.21
# of blue-collars 34.01 9.04 3.98
Mean wage 16.03 19.65 20.26
Mean wage white-collars 22.33 22.73 22.38
Mean wage blue-collars 13.75 16.32 16.96
Wage stucture
Wabe bill (in k e) 876.8 590.5 214.2
Share of <1.6MW in WB 0.56 0.24 0.18
Share of <2.5MW in WB 0.83 0.69 0.67
Firm performance
Sales (in k e) 6463 3876 1244
EBIT (in k e) 234 245 67
VA per worker (in k e) 70.1 85.8 96
Assets (in k e) 3378.3 2902.9 538.2
Profitability (EBIT/sales) 3.618 % 6.326 % 5.376 %
Industries
Manufacturing 0.15 0.11 0.09
Construction 0.17 0.18 0.18
Retail 0.42 0.32 0.31
Services 0.18 0.33 0.37
Other 0.04 0.02 0.02
Observations 328693 30258 8172
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for the balanced estimation samples depending on restric-
tions regarding the 2012 share of the wage bill accruing to workers whose hourly wage lays between 2.2
and 2.8 MW. Statistics are displayed : in Column (1) regarding all firms, in Column (2) regarding firms
whose wage bill share exceeds 30%, in Column (3) regarding firms whose wage bill share exceeds 50%.
44
B Robustness
B.1 Employee-level incidence
B.1.1 Distribution of new hires’ wage
Table A2: Detection of bunching of new hires before the threshold of CICE, [2.3, 2.5]
Before the CICE After the CICE
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
[2.0, 2.5] -0.004 -0.03 -0.03 1.76 -1.95 0.54 1.21
(0.65) (0.68) (0.68) (0.82) (0.54) (0.86) (0.77)
[2.1, 2.5] 0.02 0.29 -0.03 0.75 -0.32 1.32 0.44
(0.47) (0.57) (0.68) (0.53) (0.45) (0.70) (0.67)
[2.2, 2.5] -0.41 -0.38 -0.03 0.08 -0.07 -0.08 0.37
(0.38) (0.38) (0.68) (0.35) (0.37) (0.51) (0.39)
[2.3, 2.5] 0.39 -0.16 -0.03 0.48 0.10 0.01 0.02
(0.30) (0.26) (0.68) (0.30) (0.27) (0.32) (0.28)
[2.4, 2.5] -0.05 -0.11 -0.03 0.08 0.04 0.004 -0.10
(0.18) (0.19) (0.68) (0.17) (0.16) (0.19) (0.19)
Note: New hires are defined as workers whose contract starts during the year and that were not pre-
viously employed in the same firm. Sample restrictions: The sample is restricted to employees whose
contract starts during the year and that were not previously employed in the same firm. We further re-
strict the analysis to employers included in the firm-level estimation sample. Sources: DADS 2009-2015.
*: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; ***: p<0.001.
B.1.2 Distribution of continuing employees’ wage growth
B.2 Firm-level incidence
B.2.1 Grid definitions
B.2.2 Window definitions
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Figure A1: Distribution of wage growth of stayers
Note: Stayers are defined as workers in permanent contract working full-time (32 hrs per week or more)
who kept the same occupation within the same firm between t and t− 1. Sample restriction: The sample
is restricted employees in permanent contracts from year t to t− 1 who stay within the same employer.
We further restrict the analysis to employers included in the firm-level estimation sample. Bins are
defined as intervals of equal length. The length is set so that there are 150 bins over the [150%, 350%]
interval. Source: DADS 2009-2015.
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Table A3: Impact on hourly wages, DiD
Finer grid, 2 percentage points cell width
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Zi × 1{t ≥ 2013} 0.466*** 0.467*** 0.448*** 0.523*** 0.515*** 0.500*** 0.673*** 0.695*** 0.700***
(0.0816) (0.0791) (0.0739) (0.0986) (0.0957) (0.0893) (0.142) (0.138) (0.129)
Observations 688819 593866 580146 134879 116471 113027 37572 32418 31285
R2 0.911 0.920 0.926 0.812 0.827 0.838 0.718 0.735 0.756
Window defining cells (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8)
% WB in window 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5
Width Cells .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02
Lagged Controls
√ √ √
# firms 104147 104093 103170 20652 20643 20414 5773 5770 5693
Note: Each regression includes a set of cells × year fixed-effects. Cells are defined as a unique combi-
nation of the proportion of wage bill accruing to workers making less than 2.2 and less than 2.8 times
the minimum wage (both variables are discretized through truncation into 51 values), 3-digit sector and
size (4 categories). Lagged controls includes (log of) value-added per workers, asset value and the 2012
share of wage-bill accrued to workers earning below 1.5 times the minimum wage interacted with a
full set of year dummies. The baseline sample includes firms in the for-profit sector present in FARE,
DADS and MVC files that are observed for the entire period (balanced sample). The number of obser-
vations do not include firms in cells where the variation of the treatment is null. Robust standard errors
in parentheses (firm-level cluster). Sources: DADS, FARE, MVC 2009-2015. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
Table A4: Impact on hourly wages, DiD
Larger grid, 5 percentage points cell width
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Zi × 1{t ≥ 2013} 0.383*** 0.386*** 0.362*** 0.477*** 0.470*** 0.440*** 0.605*** 0.619*** 0.612***
(0.0717) (0.0696) (0.0650) (0.0901) (0.0875) (0.0816) (0.131) (0.127) (0.119)
Observations 874353 753350 735918 167522 144589 140358 44476 38379 37024
R2 0.908 0.917 0.923 0.819 0.834 0.846 0.722 0.740 0.761
Window defining cells (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8)
% WB in window 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5
Width Cells .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05
Lagged Controls
√ √ √
# firms 131481 131416 130252 25560 25548 25268 6819 6816 6722
Note: Each regression includes a set of cells × year fixed-effects. Cells are defined as a unique combi-
nation of the proportion of wage bill accruing to workers making less than 2.2 and less than 2.8 times
the minimum wage (both variables are discretized through truncation into 21 values), 3-digit sector and
size (4 categories). Lagged controls includes (log of) value-added per workers, asset value and the 2012
share of wage-bill accrued to workers earning below 1.5 times the minimum wage interacted with a
full set of year dummies. The baseline sample includes firms in the for-profit sector present in FARE,
DADS and MVC files that are observed for the entire period (balanced sample). The number of obser-
vations do not include firms in cells where the variation of the treatment is null. Robust standard errors
in parentheses (firm-level cluster). Sources: DADS, FARE, MVC 2009-2015. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Table A5: Impact on hourly wages, DiD
2.3-2.7 MW window, 3.33 percentage points cell width
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Zi × 1{t ≥ 2013} 0.278*** 0.248*** 0.215** 0.339*** 0.282** 0.241** 0.489*** 0.455** 0.413**
(0.0945) (0.0914) (0.0855) (0.123) (0.119) (0.111) (0.185) (0.179) (0.167)
Observations 648587 558828 545529 83386 71972 69816 21289 18349 17714
R2 0.917 0.925 0.931 0.803 0.818 0.830 0.715 0.734 0.756
Window defining cells (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7)
% WB in window 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5
Width Cells .033 .033 .033 .033 .033 .033 .033 .033 .033
Lagged Controls
√ √ √
# firms 97802 97751 96852 12784 12777 12642 3274 3273 3234
Note: Each regression includes a set of cells × year fixed-effects. Cells are defined as a unique combi-
nation of the proportion of wage bill accruing to workers making less than 2.3 and less than 2.7 times
the minimum wage (both variables are discretized through truncation into 31 values), 3-digit sector and
size (4 categories). Lagged controls includes (log of) value-added per workers, asset value and the 2012
share of wage-bill accrued to workers earning below 1.5 times the minimum wage interacted with a
full set of year dummies. The baseline sample includes firms in the for-profit sector present in FARE,
DADS and MVC files that are observed for the entire period (balanced sample). The number of obser-
vations do not include firms in cells where the variation of the treatment is null. Robust standard errors
in parentheses (firm-level cluster). Sources: DADS, FARE, MVC 2009-2015. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
Table A6: Impact on hourly wages, DiD
2.3-2.7 MW window, 5 percentage points cell width
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Zi × 1{t ≥ 2013} 0.274*** 0.248** 0.211** 0.311** 0.280** 0.237** 0.467** 0.475** 0.459**
(0.103) (0.0999) (0.0937) (0.130) (0.126) (0.118) (0.194) (0.189) (0.179)
Observations 547399 471904 460855 72956 63030 61248 19143 16516 15992
R2 0.918 0.927 0.932 0.797 0.813 0.825 0.725 0.744 0.764
Window defining cells (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7)
% WB in window 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5
Width Cells .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02
Lagged Controls
√ √ √
# firms 82826 82793 82066 11196 11193 11078 2948 2947 2914
Note: Each regression includes a set of cells × year fixed-effects. Cells are defined as a unique combi-
nation of the proportion of wage bill accruing to workers making less than 2.3 and less than 2.7 times
the minimum wage (both variables are discretized through truncation into 21 values), 3-digit sector and
size (4 categories). Lagged controls includes (log of) value-added per workers, asset value and the 2012
share of wage-bill accrued to workers earning below 1.5 times the minimum wage interacted with a
full set of year dummies. The baseline sample includes firms in the for-profit sector present in FARE,
DADS and MVC files that are observed for the entire period (balanced sample). The number of obser-
vations do not include firms in cells where the variation of the treatment is null. Robust standard errors
in parentheses (firm-level cluster). Sources: DADS, FARE, MVC 2009-2015. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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Table A7: Impact on hourly wages, DiD
2.3-2.7 MW window, 2 percentage points cell width
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Zi × 1{t ≥ 2013} 0.251*** 0.233*** 0.192** 0.320*** 0.287** 0.247** 0.477*** 0.462*** 0.428***
(0.0896) (0.0868) (0.0810) (0.119) (0.115) (0.107) (0.180) (0.174) (0.162)
Observations 707151 609167 594722 90125 77803 75500 22723 19591 18930
R2 0.913 0.922 0.928 0.801 0.817 0.829 0.709 0.729 0.751
Window defining cells (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7) (2.3 ,2.7)
% WB in window 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5
Width Cells .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05
Lagged Controls
√ √ √
# firms 106369 106317 105319 13794 13786 13630 3491 3490 3448
Note: Each regression includes a set of cells × year fixed-effects. Cells are defined as a unique combi-
nation of the proportion of wage bill accruing to workers making less than 2.3 and less than 2.7 times
the minimum wage (both variables are discretized through truncation into 51 values), 3-digit sector and
size (4 categories). Lagged controls includes (log of) value-added per workers, asset value and the 2012
share of wage-bill accrued to workers earning below 1.5 times the minimum wage interacted with a
full set of year dummies. The baseline sample includes firms in the for-profit sector present in FARE,
DADS and MVC files that are observed for the entire period (balanced sample). The number of obser-
vations do not include firms in cells where the variation of the treatment is null. Robust standard errors
in parentheses (firm-level cluster). Sources: DADS, FARE, MVC 2009-2015. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
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B.2.3 Treatment intensity based on other years
Table A8: Impact on hourly wages, DiD
Treatment intensity based on 2010 wagebill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Zi × 1{t ≥ 2013} 0.322*** 0.286*** 0.254*** 0.458*** 0.443*** 0.385*** 0.584*** 0.611*** 0.575***
(0.0851) (0.0825) (0.0773) (0.115) (0.112) (0.104) (0.174) (0.170) (0.161)
Observations 1066452 919002 898334 146061 126056 122347 33019 28501 27518
R2 0.906 0.916 0.922 0.812 0.829 0.841 0.717 0.738 0.759
Window defining cells (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8)
% WB in window 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5
Width Cells .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05
Lagged Controls
√ √ √
# firms 160543 160462 159121 22316 22305 22066 5076 5074 5011
Note: Reported coefficients are for the treatment intensity variable interacted with a post-2013 dummy
as presented in Equation (4). Each regression includes lagged controls, firm fixed-effects and a set of
cells × year fixed-effects. Cells are defined as the interaction of di
Cells are defined as a unique combination of the proportion of wage bill accruing to workers making less
than 2.2 and less than 2.8 times the minimum wage (both variables are discretized through truncation
into 31 values), 3-digit sector and size (4 categories). Lagged controls includes (log of) value-added per
workers, asset value and the 2012 share of wage-bill accrued to workers earning below 1.5 times the
minimum wage interacted with a full set of year dummies. The baseline sample includes firms in the
for-profit sector present in FARE, DADS and MVC files that are observed for the entire period (balanced
sample). The number of observations do not include firms in cells where the variation of the treatment
is null.
Robust standard errors in parentheses (firm-level cluster), * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Sources:
DADS, FARE, MVC 2009-2015.
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Table A9: Impact on hourly wages, DiD
Treatment intensity based on 2011 and 2012 wagebills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Zi × 1{t ≥ 2013} 0.351*** 0.316*** 0.286*** 0.487*** 0.472*** 0.414*** 0.616*** 0.638*** 0.586***
(0.0848) (0.0822) (0.0772) (0.114) (0.111) (0.104) (0.173) (0.169) (0.160)
Observations 1066532 919067 898248 145741 125785 122056 32892 28390 27416
R2 0.906 0.916 0.922 0.812 0.829 0.841 0.715 0.737 0.758
Window defining cells (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8) (2.2 ,2.8)
% WB in window 0 0 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5
Width Cells .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05 .05
Lagged Controls
√ √ √
# firms 160547 160460 159102 22263 22254 22009 5059 5057 4997
Note: Reported coefficients are for the treatment intensity variable interacted with a post-2013 dummy
as presented in Equation (4). Each regression includes lagged controls, firm fixed-effects and a set of
cells × year fixed-effects. Cells are defined as the interaction of di
Cells are defined as a unique combination of the proportion of wage bill accruing to workers making less
than 2.2 and less than 2.8 times the minimum wage (both variables are discretized through truncation
into 31 values), 3-digit sector and size (4 categories). Lagged controls includes (log of) value-added per
workers, asset value and the 2012 share of wage-bill accrued to workers earning below 1.5 times the
minimum wage interacted with a full set of year dummies. The baseline sample includes firms in the
for-profit sector present in FARE, DADS and MVC files that are observed for the entire period (balanced
sample). The number of observations do not include firms in cells where the variation of the treatment
is null.
Robust standard errors in parentheses (firm-level cluster), * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Sources:
DADS, FARE, MVC 2009-2015.
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